After Virtue presents a review of the history of Western moral thought. Its central theme is a discussion of the way in which the idea of virtue has been dis-planted as the central concept in moral theory. He argues for skepticism in regards to the late modern Western moral tradition. Kantianism, Utilitarianism, and Natural Rights ideologies are all argued against in favor of Thomistic-Aristotelian virtue ethics. MacIntyre is skeptical about the ability to talk about morality in a meaningful way apart from questions of the purpose of human life. He is also critical of concepts which are too fictional or too abstract to provide any real standards of guidance for human behavior.
Aristotelian ethics, like Utilitarian ethics, is in favor of the view that morality, at its core, is about supporting happiness. MacIntyre argues in favor of Aristotelian ethics and against Utilitarian ethics. I think the core of why he supports one and not the other despite the common goals of the two systems is because of the language which is being used in the Utilitarian system. It is not merely enough to have the right goal. In order for a system to be a successful one must not merely have the right goal, but also the right description of that goal, and the right description of the path to the achievement of that goal. MacIntyre argues that the concept of Utility is a fiction. We cannot know what would be the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The ascertainment of what this would be in practice cannot occur because one cannot know all possible pleasures so as to know which is the greatest. Furthermore, the language itself rests upon the assumption that pleasures can be objectively ranked in such a way so that there would be a greatest possible pleasure.
(Work in progress-to be continued).