Eric Bleys
Philosophy 221
12/9/2016
Marco Dees Bard College
Two Arguments for Relationism
This paper will present two arguments in favor of relationism as opposed to substantivism. These two arguments will address the philosophical debate between these two theories about the nature of space. One of the arguments demonstrates that if someone is a theist then they must also be a relationist. The other is a non theistic argument for relationism to show that it is a true position even if one does not believe in God. This argument takes the position that space as a concept is derived from empirical experience and only has meaning as a description of empirical experience. The argument then uses this premise to argue that space is relational because empirical experience itself is relational. One argument uses a metaphysical premise, the existence of God, to argue in favor of relationism. Whereas the other argument, tries to reduce the concept of space to empirical phenomena and thereby show that space is relational.
How would one argue that space, as an experience, can only exist through perceived relations between objects? Let us take the opposite thesis of the one presented above and then see if it is indeed a true thesis. Let us suppose that there was space with no objects. Can we conceive of space without objects? Or is the relationship between objects a fundamental part of the definition of space? What would space without objects be? Without light we cannot imagine our powers of vision functioning at all. And likewise without sound waves we could not hear. And also it is true that without objects to touch we could feel nothing. So then without objects our sense of touch or taste would be non existent. And if this was true we could make no judgement that X is closer to us than Y. If I think an object cannot be deemed to be closer or further from us then in what sense can there be space? Is the concept of space predicated on this notion of distance?
The idea that space is about the distance of objects from us presupposes a relationist position in regards to the nature of spatial reality. This is because it defines space in terms of the way which we experience it relative to our own position in the world. But what if our judgements about space are actually judgements about the distance between objects as they are objectively apart from each other within an absolute field like a Cartesian coordinate system? Space is fundamentally empirical because we cannot conceive of distance between objects without objects and we cannot conceive of objects without sensory experience. Even the metaphor of the Cartesian coordinate system itself creates mental images which themselves are rooted in an empirical experience of observing the coordinate system and solving problems on it during school.
This would seem to imply that relationism is true because space originates from our empirical perception which is rooted in our bodily systems. Space, cannot be conceived of apart from these systems and cannot be conceived of apart from us.
Here is a counter argument to this position. What if we cannot ontologically separate ourselves from the world? And therefore, our perception, as part of the world, is not merely relative to ourselves but to the world of which we are a part? Furthermore, we have a capacity to agree upon the distances between objects. Thus multiple perceptions from multiple human empirical bodily experiences often perceive the same sense of space. And therefore space is not entirely relative to the individual sense we can agree upon measurements of the distance of a football field.
But perhaps it is relative to individuals as a whole? We still experience disagreements in regards to what judgements to apply to particular experiences of space. For example, one baseball player will make a judgement about the position of a baseball within space in such a way that he can hit the ball with his bat. Whereas another baseball player makes a different judgement about the position of the ball within space and therefore cannot hit the baseball. In this case it is judgements not only about the position of the baseball but also of the speed of the baseball, as well as the direction of the baseball, as well as the speed and direction of one's own swing towards the baseball. Multiple judgements about space converge into one decision.
This can also be taken as an example to be used in favor of relationism. Because predicting events requires perceiving objects relative to one's own mental facilities. Just as predicting whether or not an object will hit you depends on your motion relative to its motion. Furthermore, nothing can be thought of as not being in motion. Or at least nothing physical can be thought of as not being in motion. If we say that I am at rest on a bed then we must take into account that the bed is on an earth which itself is in motion. The motion is not directly perceived and yet it exists and may even influence whether or not I arise from the bed at a particular time. If the sun comes up at a particular time due to the position of my part of the earth relative to the sun.
However, how do we reconcile this relationism with the truth that we do occasionally find universally agreed upon measures of the distances between objects? Perhaps it is like a Cartesian coordinate system. If two people happen to be the same distance of two squares away from two objects then they will be able to come to the same conclusion about the distance between the two objects. However, if one person is four squares from the two objects. And the other is six squares away from the objects then it is clear that the person who is farther away from the objects will deem them to be closer together than the person standing four squares away.
So then space as it is experienced, is experienced relative to the position of particular individuals unless they themselves are at an equivalent distance from each other. This would imply that our experiences of space would mostly be different from others because most pairs of points on the Cartesian coordinate plan would not be the same distance from most given objects. However, this metaphorical theory of space presupposes a certain form of absolutism in regards to the nature of time. It presupposes that there is an objective plain on which the observers and objects are laid out from each other. And thus space is not merely composed of the objects and the observers but it is also composed of the lines and distances between the lines of which the Cartesian coordinate system is composed. This may be compared to the way in which in relativity theory most experiences of space are relative save those involving the speed of light. An objective structure exists within which many subjective experiences exist in relation to one another while a few experiences emerge in which judgements of spatial experiences occur in the same way. However, at no point does the experience of any individual have the ability to perceive the entirety of the Cartesian coordinate system.
A counter argument to the view that the concept of space is empirical by its very definition is that other concepts which help to explain our empirical world are not reducible to descriptions of empirical experiences and so there is no reason to think that space is any different. A good example is the idea of causation. Causation, as a concept is often used to explain empirical events. For example if someone strikes a small tree with an axe and the trees frame is broken then the tree falls over an observer would infer that the person using the axe caused the tree to fall. But is this judgement a solely empirical phenomenon? Is it made on the basis of pure observation? What if the tree actually fell over because of a strong gust of wind even as the basis of the tree was being weakened? And what if there was no gravity to move the tree towards the ground after the axe had stricken the tree? Any of these possible reasons could be the reason for why the tree feel but based on pure empirical experience alone we have a mere correlation between striking a tree with an axe and the tree then falling. And yet we describe this correlation as an example of causation. If we are to deem one of the given explanations as the cause for the tree falling it is because of the strong correlation of events as well as the relevance of these events to the falling of the tree. If some event is very relevant to another event and this events correlates with the other event happening then this event will be deemed to be the cause of the other event if there is no other event which is more relevant and correlates more strongly with the second event. This requires a kind of comparative thought which itself does not come directly from our observation of the world. We judge things to be the causes of other things and yet there is nothing about empirical experience that dictates that we have to make this judgement. This seems different from space in which empirical experience directly tells us if an object is farther from us than another object.
There are two reasons to think that causation is more than just an empirical concept. One reason is the fact that we often attribute non empirical ideas such as “gravity” as causes of empirical events. For this reason we can say that there are cases in which our understanding of a causal event consists of more than empirical events causing other empirical events. The second reason to think that causation is more than just an empirical concept is that empirical experience does not directly tell us that one thing has caused another. But we can easily say that another event, event x, is the actual cause of the later event y, when we had ascribed y to the event z.
Here’s a counter argument to the argument above. The concept of space is fundamentally different from the concept of causation in such a way that space as a concept can only be empirically defined. This is because explanations for the distance between objects rely directly on empirical insight and do not involve making judgements on the basis of correlations. If I perceive an object five miles ahead of me the explanation for this distance will be that it is due to the speed at which I and the object have been moving towards or away from one another. And this judgement is made intuitively without conscious reasoning. However, there is a similarity that often our beliefs about causation are likewise made intuitively and without conscious reflection.
The difference is in the fact that causation often departs in its usage from direct empirical intuition of events and used to explain abstract relationships. For example, we often say that a particular ideology is causing particular actions. However, we cannot empirically perceive any ideology. We cannot touch, see, taste, or hear Marxism. And yet we ascribe to Marxism an influence on human behavior which we can perceive empirically.
We also say that laws of nature cause particular events. We use this concept to explain causation as well as space. So both space and causation are concepts which rely upon abstract laws. The laws cannot be empirically perceived so it would seem that space then must be a concept which has more than just empirical content. But are the laws themselves mere descriptions of empirical content? They are based on empirically observed tendencies in the relationships between objects. As concepts they could never have been developed without empirical insight. Rational thought plays an interpretive role in developing these laws. However this is different from using entirely non-empirical concepts for explaining an event. And there is no case in which ideologies create spatial realities. One can object that ideas cause behaviors which themselves exist within space. However what about the causation which occurs between an idea and a person's worldview? This is a case in which causation takes on an entirely non-empirical character.
In the next section we will argue that if someone is a theist then they must also be a relationist. This means that a logical implication exists between theism and relationism. In such a way that if theism is true then relationism must also be true. God could create the universe with an abstract, unseen structure, which imposes an order onto a network of subjective experiences of which space is composed. But one might object that this order is itself space. However, it cannot be experienced directly but only influences our experiences of space.
How does this theory relate to the criticism of Leibniz that absolute space makes the decisions of God into something arbitrary? Under the theory presented in the preceding paragraphs space is experienced always as something particular in the sense that no two observations are exactly alike. Although it is true that we are able to make equivalent measurements the two observers are still experiencing space differently. The similarity is that the same distance between observed objects is understood because both observers are two spaces north and south of the line between the two objects. However, the observer to the north observes object A to his right and object B to his left. In contrast the observer to the south observers object B to his right and object A to his left. If the two observers wanted to move towards object B then the southern observer would move right and the northern observer would move left. And thus although a judgement may be the same between two positions it does not follow from this that all elements of one's experience of space are the same between the two positions. In fact, the relationship between the self and the objects is fundamentally different as our experiences of space are what dictates how it is we can move towards a particular object. This theory therefore maintains the sublime dignity of each of God’s decisions in the physical world because every experience of space is slightly different from the experiences of others. Therefore no divine decision is arbitrary and hence the superiority of all decisions over other decisions is maintained.
This claim rests upon a particular understanding of God which was understood by both Leibniz and Newton and is consistent with the traditions of Christianity which they believed. The idea is that God is both perfect and also rational. And if God is both perfect and rational then his or her decisions must be both perfect and rational. What is the consequence of this understanding? If the divine decisions are perfect then why should any decision not be the best possible decision? And if a decision is arbitrary then how is it the best possible decision? It cannot be the greatest of all decisions because another decision can be its equal. If God were not rational then this would not be a problem. Because then God could merely make decisions without clear reasons. And therefore a pointless decision such as making two versions of the exact same spatial experience would be problematic. What if God was perfect and yet irrational? This is a hard position to maintain when we consider that rationality is considered to be a perfection. And yet in some sense it makes sense that divine rationality would be deemed irrational by the standards of the flawed rationality of imperfect beings such as humans.
It seems clear that a defense of the absolutist view of space would require the position that part of space is entirely objective. This objective structure within space would have to in some sense be perceivable because space itself is an empirical phenomenon. So this aspect of space must coexist with the subjectivity and particularity which exists within our experiences of space. There must be, therefore, a special way of observing space in which this objective structure can be accessed. Because, unlike our unobservable structure, this structure does not merely impose an order on to space but exists within space itself. But how can we say that we can observe this special element of space? How do we step outside of ourselves and experience this? Do we necessarily need to step outside of ourselves?
Which of the two perspectives makes the most sense from an empiricist vs a rationalist standpoint in terms of epistemology? A rationalist prioritizes reason as the primary means of gaining knowledge whereas an empiricist prioritizes empirical experience as the most important method for gaining knowledge. If we are to assume that reason and not sensory data is our guide to truth then what kind of perspective would we develop on the relationism vs substantivist debate? As we mentioned earlier space is an empirical concept. So therefore space would be less important of an experience in giving us knowledge due to its empirical nature. However, if we are to assume the importance of the internal mind in creating knowledge then perhaps we can use this internal rational process as the source of comprehension of the objective spatial order. For although empirical experience alone only gives us a subjective experience of space, reason may be able to bridge these experiences together into some kind of understanding of this objective structure of space.
But how would such a process occur? If we find ourselves searching for some aspect of the pattern which transcends particularity then we should look for consistent patterns within those patterns which we can point to as laws. Critical thinking can link together relevant pieces of experience and ask itself, “what is the common link between all of these experiences and what principals can be used to rationally infer particular outcomes?” This ability to logically infer predictions about the future may itself be an intellectual encounter with the objective aspect of space. The laws of physics seem to serve as a testimony in favor of this view. In the same way in which we can use these laws to make future predictions about what will occur in space our rational model for accessing the objective aspect of space operates through the use of reason to make rules about the functionality of space. These rules appear to transcend the limitations of particular experiences of space because of their ability to make accurate predictions about what will happen to the structure of space during different events in the future. This ability gives credence to the claim that this method of thought gives us access to the objective aspect of space because of its ability to transcend particular experiences while explaining their place within the puzzle.
Therefore, under this model, the objective aspect of space could only be perceived or understood through the mind's eye. This is also consistent with the view that space is a function of the human mind. If space originates from the faculties of the mind then we could say that reason is what organizes the diverse experiences of those faculties into principals. These principles then would constitute the objective, or absolutist aspect of space. Whereas the diverse experiences and processes which have not been formalized into laws would be subjective. If our experiences of the world are really structured more by our internal self rather than the outside world then this would be a very useful way of thinking of space if this assumption is true.
In conclusion the views of substantivalism and relationism each have different implications for theism as well as epistemology. However, relationism is more compatible with theism if theism is understood as belief in a perfect and rational supreme being. This is true because relationism allows for such utter particularity in the structure of space that no decision made by God would be arbitrary. Instead, each decision could be seen as the greatest of all possibilities. Each with its own unique and sublime purpose.
Relationism also had the ability to explain both the existence of objective structure to the world as well as the subjective structure of space as experienced by observers through the theory which I presented above depicting an unobserved structure imposing order onto the empirical spatial order. The theory itself may seem mystical. However recognition of mystery is a sign of intellectual brilliance and dignity. And the theory neither contradicts the need for structure nor the theory of space as entirely relational. The view of space as entirely relational may be attacked as being too relativistic to explain a world in which agreed upon common judgements exist. However, the theory shows that this element of the world need not necessarily be attributed to space but to another feature of the world. And this feature of existence, in the theory, is not itself part of space, but exists as something else altogether.